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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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This paper presents the results of an attempt to use the 
combined results of the dedicated survey performed 
by CASE in 2007 and Polish LFS data in order to: (a) 
analyze the development of the shadow employment 
in Poland in years 2003–2008 and, (b) analyze 
the transition probabilities in and out of shadow 
employment. The estimated share of shadow workers 
in total employment in Poland in years 2003–2008 was 
increasing until 2006 and then started to decrease in the 
years 2007 and 2008. Other results are in line with one 
This paper is a product of the Human Development Economics Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger 
effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions 
around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author 
may be contacted at Mateusz.Walewski@case-research.eu.   
of the main conclusions of the CASE study from 2007 
suggesting that shadow employment is more a way of 
coping with lack of other employment opportunities than 
an equivalent or even superior alternative to any legal 
employment contracts. On the other hand those who 
enter shadow employment are more active part of the 
group having problems with finding full time/open term 
employment. They are much more inclined to cope with 
their situation by entering some form of self-employment 
than to stay passive and depend on social assistance. 
An attempt to measure the trends in shadow employment in Poland  
The  transition  probabilities  out  and  into  shadow  employment  using  the  LFS  data 
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to understand the underlying factors that determine the size of informal employment in the shadow economy, providing 
background technical analysis for a forthcoming World Bank regional study ―In from the Shadow: Integrating Europe's 
Informal Labor‖. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may 
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1.  Introduction 
The  phenomenon  of  shadow  employment  in  Poland  is  monitored  by  the  Polish  Central 
Statistical Office (CEO). The estimates of the number of the shadow employees in Poland are 
published annually  in  the Statistical  Annuals.  Apart from  that, more detailed assessments 
were  performed  three  times  between  the  years  1995  and  2004  by  the  dedicated  irregular 
module of the Labor Force Survey (LFS) performed in Poland on a quarterly basis. According 
to CEO estimates, the number of shadow employees in Poland in years 1995-2006 fluctuated 
between 663,000 in 1998 and 1,079,000 in 2006 - from 4.3% to 7.3% of total employment in 
Poland.  
Unfortunately,  the  micro-data  from  the  dedicated  survey  tend  not  be  made  available  for 
researchers for further analysis and therefore anyone willing to analyze this issue more deeply 
has to either conduct an additional dedicated survey or try to estimate the number of shadow 
employees using the existing information.  
As a result, a number of dedicated, mostly one-off surveys of the shadow employment in 
Poland  have  been  performed  by  other  institutions.  In  1994  and  1997,  such  surveys  with 
samples of 1,000 people each were performed by The Gdansk Institute for Market Economics 
and published in Grabowski (2002). Another survey was performed by the CEBOS company 
in 2004 (CEBOS, 2005). The former indicated that the share of shadow employees in Poland 
decreased from 29.6% in 1994 to 14.1% in 1997. According to the latter, the estimated share 
of shadow employees amounted to about 13% in 2004.  
The two biggest dedicated surveys of shadow employment in Poland were performed in 2007. 
They were run independently by two institutions, both commissioned by the Polish Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs.   
One of surveys was performed by the Institute of Labor and Social Affairs in cooperation with 
CEBOS institute. According to its results out of the total sample of 9,038 persons aged 15+ 
interviewed 4.8% answered that they performed any  unregistered work within 12 months 
before the interview. Taking into account that according to the LFS, the employment rate in 
Poland  in  2007  was  48.6%  it  means  that  the  share  of  shadow  employment  in  total 
employment amounted to about 9.9%.  
The second survey was performed by CASE (Center for Social and Economic Research) in 
co-operation with Millward Brown SMG/KRC institute. The number of people interviewed 
during  this  survey  was  18,121.  Following  the  best  practice  for  similar  surveys,  the 
respondents of this survey were not asked directly about their shadow activities. The status of 
their jobs has been identified by the researchers based on a series of questions concerning the 
kind  of  working  agreement,  wage  arrangements  and  tax  and  social  security  payments. 
According  to  the  results  obtained,  9.3%  have  been  identified  as  having  fully  or  partially 
unregistered jobs either in their main or additional working place. Although the size and the 
methodology of the two surveys differed, the results obtained have been surprisingly close 
suggesting that they reveal the actual figures more or less.  
This paper presents the results of an attempt to use the results obtained by the CASE survey in 
order to: (a) analyze the development of the shadow employment in Poland in years 2003-
2008 and, (b) analyze the transition probabilities in and out of shadow employment. This 
analysis will allow us to verify the hypotheses about the nature of shadow employment. Is it 
the  way  to  registered  employment  or  a  closed  avenue  leading  either  to  the  next  shadow employment or to unemployment? The results obtained by the CASE survey indicated that the 
latter is closer to the truth, although one has to remember that any conclusions have been 
obtained based on cross-sectional data only.  
Here we will have the opportunity to run the analysis exploiting the quasi-panel nature of the 
Polish LFS. It will enable us to observe the changes of the relative labor market position of 
those with higher probability of shadow employment in the booming labor market of Poland 
during most of the analyzed period. We will also be able to say something about the counter-
cyclicality and pro-cyclicality of shadow employment in Poland.  
 
2.  Data and Definitions 
The data used for the analysis are as follows: the dedicated CASE survey performed in 2007 
(later called CASE_2007) and the micro-files from the Polish LFS data from years 2003-
2008.  
The results of the CASE 2007 survey enable one to analyze shadow employment according to 
several definitions. According to the narrowest one, the shadow employees are only those 
working without any written contract, i.e. those with verbal agreements only. It is obvious that 
these workers neither pay any taxes and/or social contributions, nor are they covered by any 
rules regulating the standard working contract. Those who are self-employed running their 
business activities without being registered are a very similar group as they do not pay any 
taxes nor are protected by any legal regulations. The other groups are those having some kind 
of written contract or registration but either not paying any taxes and/or social contributions, 
or employees obtaining part of their salaries ―in envelope‖ or the self-employed hiding part of 
their revenue in order to avoid taxes.  
The methodology of creating the proxy variables for shadow employment in the LFS data was 
based on the idea of predicting the probability of shadow employment for individual workers 
in  LFS,  using  the  previous  estimated  coefficients  of  the  probabilistic  models  in  the 
CASE_2007 database. This methodology is based on the idea of Propensity Score Matching; 
however in this case, different data sets are used for model estimation and for calculating the 
―propensity scores‖.  
The first step of the analysis was to select the groups of shadow workers to be used for the 
analysis, i.e., the groups of shadow workers to be later ―matched‖ by observations from the 
LFS data-set. For the reasons of analytical clarity, it was decided to use only those working 
without any written contract and those working with some form of written contract but not 
paying any taxes or social security contributions (later called shadow employees) and the 
same group extended to self-employed (or employers) with unregistered firms (latter called 
shadow workers). In either case, only those who were employed in the shadow sector in their 
main job have been taken into account. Further in text both of these groups are referred to as 
shadow workers according to basic definitions. 
The next step was to identify the set of explanatory variables to be used in the ―matching 
models‖. The important limitation was that all the explanatory variables used in the model 
specification had to be transformable so as to achieve common definitions and categories for 
CASE_2007 database and for each and every LFS database used in the further course of the 
analysis (for years 2003-2007). The  following  set  of  variables  fulfills  the  condition  above  and  has  been  used  for  the 
―matching‖:  
  Region – 16 Polish voivodships 
  Gender 
  Position in household head – head, partner, other 
  Age – age groups - 15-24, 25-34...., 65+ 
  Education level - Tertiary, Secondary Professional, Secondary General, Vocational, 
Below Vocational 
  Civil Status - Free, Married, Widow(er), Divorced 
  Economic  Activity  –  Agriculture,  Mining,  Manufacturing,  Communal  Services, 
Construction, Trade and repairs, Hotels and Catering, Other market services, Non-
market services (education, health, administration aso), Persons working for private 
households, Other. 
  Size of the company - below 10, 10-49, 50-100, more than 100, does not know 
  Ownership – private or mixed, public 
  Contract – Full time and Open Term, Full time and Fixed Term, Part Time and Open 
Term, Part Time and Fixed Term, Self-Employed.  
The contract variable deserves special attention here as it plays a decisive role in matching 
and therefore has to be used in the model specification. At the same time, it creates the most 
important econometric and analytical problems during the initial estimation and then during 
the prediction (matching) procedure.  
The problem results from the fact that the workers who declared to be employees with verbal 
agreements in CASE_2007 had to be classified in ―contract‖ variable to one of categories. It 
appeared most logical and closest to their actual labor market status to classify them all as 
fixed term workers. Then, some of them were classified as full time and some as part time 
workers using the information about the actual hours they worked - working for less than 30 
hours per week has been considered part-time work. This was important for our results as it 
seriously increased the number of those in shadow employment among the fixed term workers 
(so we additionally reinforced the significance of this variable in our model(s) by definition) 
and the resulting estimated average probabilities of shadow employment in LFS for each year 
are strongly correlated with the changing share of fixed term employees in total employment. 
There are two strong arguments to apply this procedure: 
(1) Those with ‗verbal agreements only‘ are one of the biggest and ―purest‖ groups of 
shadow employees; therefore, they have to be taken into account in our analysis,  
(2) One may very reasonably assume that a verbal agreement is much more similar to a 
fixed term than to an open term contract and that many of those with verbal contracts 
fixed term employment in a LFS.  
The general trend in shadow employment has also been estimated applying two alternative 
ways: 
(1) The versions of the models for the same definitions of shadow employment variables 
but without the ―contract‖ variable in the models‘ specifications, 
(2) The new variable has been created representing shadow employment where those with 
verbal contracts have not been taken into account and the ―contract‖ variable has been 
used  as  one  of  the  explanatory  variables.  We  refer  to  this  definition  of  shadow employment as the narrow one in the following text, as opposed to the basic one 
described earlier.  
Therefore there are three estimation procedures used to identify the workers in LFS matching 
of the shadow workers from the CASE 2007 database: 
  Estimations where basic definitions were used and the contract variable was included 
into the model specification 
  Estimations where basic definitions were used but without the contract variable in the 
model specification 
  Estimations with narrow definitions of shadow employees and workers used and with 
the contract variable used in model specification.  
Simple  Probit  and  Logit  models  have  been  estimated  for  variables  representing  various 
definitions of shadow employment on the left hand side and all variables created on the right 
hand  side  of  the  model  in  the  basic  case.  The  models  have  been  estimated  using  the 
CASE_2007 dataset. In the estimations the employees, the self-employed and the employers 
have  been  excluded  from  the  sample.  The  mining  sector  has  been  excluded  from  all 
estimations as there were no shadow employees working in this sector and hence it predicted 
failure (i.e. legal employment) in 100% of cases. 
The estimated coefficients have then been used to predict the probabilities of working in 
shadow employment in the LFS 2003-2008. As a result 12 variables with various shadow 
employment  proxies  (probabilities)  have  been  obtained  for  each  employed  in  the  LFS 
samples: 
  4 for the basic case (from logit model for employees only, from probit model for 
employees only, from logit model for employees and self-employed and from probit 
model for employees and self employed),  
  4 for the respective models without ―contract‖ variable in specifications and  
  4  for  respective  models  where  narrow  definitions  of  shadow  employment  where 
applied (i.e. excluding those with verbal contracts).  
 
 
3.  Results on the General Trend in Shadow Employment in 2003-2008 
The  resulting  general  trends  estimates  for  the  share  of  shadow  employment  in  total 
employment are very similar for both logit and probit models (see Table 1 – all rows). The 
results (in terms of trends) do not significantly differ between shadow employees and shadow 
workers either. The observed absolute values differ obviously as for the latter the definition of 
shadow employment is broader. (See Table 1 – all rows.) 
There are significant (and obviously expected) differences in absolute values of estimated 
average probabilities depending on definition of shadow employment used (broad (basic)-
including those with verbal contracts only vs. narrow – without those with verbal contracts)  
(compare Table 1 rows 1-8 with rows 9-12.). The trends however are very similar to those 
observed for the basic case. 
On the other hand there are significant differences in time trends observed depending on 
model specifications for basic definitions of shadow employment (compare Table 1 rows 1-4 
with rows 5-8). Table 1 Average predicted probabilities of employment in shadow economy according to all 
definitions of shadow employment and model specifications 
Row  Model   Dependent variable  Years 
      2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Basic version  - basic definition of shadow employment, all variables used in estimated models 
1  Logit  Shadow employees   2.6%  2.9%  3.1%  3.2%  3.3%  3.2% 
2  Probit  Shadow employees  2.6%  2.9%  3.1%  3.2%  3.3%  3.2% 
3  Logit  Shadow workers  3.5%  3.7%  3.8%  3.9%  3.9%  3.7% 
4  Probit  Shadow workers  3.5%  3.7%  3.8%  3.9%  3.9%  3.7% 
Basic definition of shadow employment – estimated models without ―contract‖ variable 
5  Logit  Shadow employees   2.7%  2.8%  2.8%  2.9%  3.1%  3.3% 
6  Probit  Shadow employees  2.8%  2.8%  2.9%  3.0%  3.1%  3.3% 
7  Logit  Shadow workers  3.6%  3.6%  3.6%  3.7%  3.7%  3.8% 
8  Probit  Shadow workers  3.7%  3.7%  3.7%  3.8%  3.8%  3.8% 
Narrow  definition  of  shadow  employment    (without  those  with  oral  agreements  only)–  all  variables  used  in 
estimated models 
9  Logit  Shadow employees   0.5%  0.6%  0.6%  0.7%  0.7%  0.7% 
10  Probit  Shadow employees  0.5%  0.6%  0.7%  0.7%  0.8%  0.7% 
11  Logit  Shadow workers  1.6%  1.6%  1.6%  1.6%  1.6%  1.5% 
12  Probit  Shadow workers  1.6%  1.6%  1.6%  1.7%  1.6%  1.5% 
Source: Authors calculations based on LFS data 2003-2008 and CASE 2006 survey database.  
The resulting general trend estimates for 2003 -2004 from probit models for shadow workers 
(including employers) are presented on Chart 1 to better illustrate the results obtained. Only 
results of the probit models are presented for the sake of clarity, as the results did not differ 
substantially between logit and probit models‘ shadow employment proxies.  
All  estimations,  where  explanatory  variables  are  used  to  obtain  the  proxy  for  shadow 
employment, show that the share of shadow employment was increasing between 2003 and 
2006, and after 2006 it started to decrease. On the other hand, the results of estimations 
without the contract variable show something else – increasing share of shadow workers in 
total employment over the entire period. These two are the qualitatively different results but 
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The probability of shadow employment estimated according to the basic definition is, by 
design, strongly dependent on the form of contract declared by the respondent in LFS. It 
significantly increases if the declared employment contract is fixed term. The share of such 
contracts  in  Poland  was  strongly  increasing  in  years  2003-2006  whereas  in  2007-2008  it 
started  to  stabilize  and  then  decrease.  The  measured  average  probability  of  shadow 
employment tends to follow the same path.  
It seems that both of these trends are related to the general developments in the Polish labor 
market. One has to remember that in 2003 the unemployment rate in Poland was very high 
reaching on average 19.5%. Then it started to decrease slowly reaching 17.8% in 2005 and 
13.8% in 2004. Then the pace of unemployment rate decrease accelerated even further falling 
to only 7.1% in 2008. It seems that the sharp increase of the number of fixed term contracts 
was one of the deciding factors in the gradual fall of unemployment rate in Poland between 
2003 and 2005. The labor market situation was still difficult and workers were still very likely 
to accept fixed term jobs. At the same time, companies did not have to compete for workers 
with better working conditions. After 2006 when the labor market situation started to improve 
very dynamically, the companies started to offer them better (more stable) working conditions 
and workers were more reluctant to accept fixed term jobs. It is logical to assume that similar 
patterns of behavior exist also in shadow employment which by most of related literature is 
assessed as counter-cyclical.  
On the other hand, the shadow employment proxy constructed without the contract variable 
does not have any explanatory variable. It shows that as unemployment was falling, more 
people with low employability started to get jobs. Additionally more jobs were also created in 
services and construction sectors – traditional hubs of shadow employment. Hence this proxy 
seems to be naturally ―pro-cyclical‖ – i.e. it increases as the labor demand grows.  
It seems that one should have a clear idea what definition of shadow employment and model 
specification will be used and why. There are strong arguments to use the basic definition and 
specification, although it results in artificial and excessively strong interdependence between 
the kind of contract declared by the respondent and shadow employment probability. 
One has to take into account that those without any written contracts are the “core” of 
shadow employment – they do not pay any taxes or social contributions and they are not 
protected  by  any  labor  regulations.  It  means  that  anyone  willing  to  analyze  shadow 
employment has to take them into account in estimations and hence they have to be classified 
into some kind of contract as available in LFS database (full/part time, fixed/open term). The 
kind  of  contract  is  also  the  only  information  available  in  the  LFS  directly  related  to  the 
concept of shadow employment. It strictly describes the nature of employment in relation to 
sectors or personal characteristics of the employed.  
The  contract  variable  also  has  strong  explanatory  power  for  shadow  employment  when 
narrow definitions are used (so our additional reinforcement is not crucial here) and that is 
why the estimations when narrow definition is used produce more or less similar shadow 
employment results as the basic version. 
Last but not least, significant share (around 17% according to the CASE_2007 survey) of 
those employed on fixed term basis in Poland do not have the standard employment contract 
but so called ―civil contracts‖ and their labor relations are not protected by labor law and 
labor courts. It means that although their contracts are legally binding, officially accepted and they  pay  taxes  and  social  security  contributions,  their  actual  ―employee  rights‖  do  not 
significantly differ from those employed in the shadow economy.  
As a consequence it has been decided to use estimated shadow employment probabilities 
based on the basic definitions of shadow variables and full model specification in the further 
course of the analysis.  
As  the  last  step  of  this  part  of  the  analysis,  the  general  trends  of  estimated  shadow 
employment for various groups in the labor market were also calculated. Some of the results 
obtained were quite interesting although not particularly surprising. The differences in the 
average size of estimated shadow employment for various groups resulting from the model 
are quite standard.  
For example, the average incidence of shadow employment in the period analyzed is higher 
for younger (below 24) and older (above 64) workers (8.7% and 5.5% respectively) than for 
other groups (3.3% on average). The probability of shadow employment is also the highest for 
those with only basic education (9.7% on average), and it falls as education attainment rises to 
0.9% for those with university degree. It is, on average, the highest for those employed for 
private households (more than 50%) followed by construction (11.8%), agriculture (8.6%) 
and hotels and restaurants (6.6%). The share of employed in shadow economy is also higher 
in small firms with less than 10 employees (7.5% on average), and to a lesser extent for those 
working in companies between 10 and 50 workers (2.5%).  
The  time  trends  for  most  employers  seem  to  follow  the  general  path  with  the  estimated 
incidence of shadow employment increasing until 2007 and then decreasing in construction, 
hotels and restaurants and also for all sizes of firms. On the other hand, interesting things 
happen for some groups of workers. The probability of entering shadow employment has been 
decreasing for the entire period for the youngest cohort and increasing for those close to 
pension  age.  The  former  might  be  related  to  the  changing  demographic  situation  with 
decreasing number of young people entering the labor market both due to natural reasons and 
increasing  participation  in  tertiary  education.  The  latter  may  result  from  changes  in  the 
disability  pension  system  limiting  the  access  to  these  kinds  of  benefits  and  resulting  in 
increasing number of older workers with relatively low employability looking for jobs.  
At the same time, the estimated probability of shadow employment kept constantly increasing 
for those with secondary education only, indicating a weakening position of this group in the 
labor market.  
Last but not least, one should also observe that the estimated share of shadow employment 
was practically stable throughout the analyzed period for groups of workers divided according 
to the type of contract. It is a consequence of the strong interdependence of contract and 
shadow variables and it proves that most of the changes in estimated shadow employment 
have been driven mainly by changing structure of employment contracts.  
4.  Shadow Employment and Labor Market Transitions 
In order to run the analysis of labor market transitions between various kinds of labor market 
statuses using the data from the Polish LFS, one has to take advantage of its quasi-panel 
nature. Each interviewee in LFS takes part in the survey four times (on a quarterly basis) with 
two quarters of brake after the second interview. It means that there is exactly one year of 
break  between  the  first  and  the  third  interview  and  between  the  second  and  the  fourth 
interview. It is then possible to create a set of databases consisting of a series of biannual panels each enabling us to observe the situation of individuals over two consecutive years. 5 
such data sets have been created for years 2003/2004 to 2007/2008. 
At first, I tried to analyze whether working in shadow employment increases the probability 
of losing or quitting a job and whether this interdependence changed over the analyzed period. 
This has been performed by estimating the series of probit models in which the probability of 
transition out of employment between ―t‖ and ―t+1‖ has been set as the dependent variable 
and estimated probability of working in shadow employment
2 (―shadow‖) in period ―t‖ has 
been  one  of  explanatory  variables.  Apart  from  that,  I  used  the  set  of  standard  control 
variables, all for period ―t‖ such as: region, age, gender, education level, and characteristics of 
employing company.  
Three  versions  of  the  model  have  been  estimated  for  each  year.  One  in  which  both  the 
―contract‖ variable and the ―shadow‖ variable have been added to model specification, and 
two with only one of those variables used.  
The estimated coefficients on control variables have been as expected - a negative relationship 
between education level and transition probability, and the lowest transition probability for 
those in prime age and higher probabilities for females.  
The contract variables are significant and similar for both specifications for all years (see 
Table 2). All employment contracts increase the probability of transition out of employment 
as compared to full time and open term contracts. It also seems that between years 2003-2007, 
when  the  labor  market  situation  was  clearly  improving,  the  influence  of  the  fixed  term 
employment on the probability of losing a job was weakening, and then it started to gain 
importance. What makes this result unexpected is that this tendency started to change already 
in 2007 when the labor market was still blossoming.  
Being a self-employed employee negatively influenced the probability of losing a job until 
2006,  but  afterwards  it  lost  its  significance.  This  may  mean  that  the  booming  economy 
strongly awards those deciding to run their own business, be it registered or unregistered. 
Most probably if our analysis continued until the crisis year, the estimated coefficients for 
self-employment would become significant again, but with the opposite sign.  
The estimated coefficients for the ‗shadow‘ variable seriously depend on model specification. 
Due to its high correlation with contract variable, it appears not to be significant for transition 
probability out of employment if both variables (i.e. ―shadow‖ and ―contract‖) are used in 
model specification. They become significant only if the contract variable is excluded from 
the analysis. 
As one could expect, working in shadow economy positively influences the probability to lose 
employment. It seems also that in the period where labor market situation was improving 
(years 2003-2007), the relative situation of those in the shadow sphere also tended to improve, 
although in absolute terms it was still much worse as compared to the legally employed. In 
2008, when one could already feel the first symptoms of the crisis, the relative probability of 
losing a job increased for those in the shadow sphere.  
It  means  that  the  labor  market  situation  of  those  working  in  any  non-standard  working 
arrangement - be it in shadow economy or even registered - is much more dependent on the 
general situation of the labor market than for those working full time and an open term basis. 
                                                 
2 The probabilities of shadow employment predicted by probit models with full specification and basic definition 
of shadow employment have been used in all estimations below.  It is a quite obvious and standard conclusion. What seems to be new here however is, that 
those in shadow sphere are, most probably, the last to gain from the economic upturn and the 
first to lose when economy start to contract.  
Table  2  -  The  estimated  coefficients  of  contract  and  shadow  variables  on  transition  from 
employment to non-employment (from probit model) 
Model/variable  2003/2004  2004/2005  2005/2006  2006/2007  2007/2008 
Shadow – only shadow variable used  0.19951  0.17448  0.15636  0.12734  0.15915 
Shadow – both variables used  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant 
Contract – only contract variable used 
full time, fixed term  0.07527  0.05689  0.05494  0.0507  0.055 
part time, open term  insignificant  0.01898  0.037  0.0151  0.02276 
part time, fixed term  0.07776  0.06582  0.0562  0.07629  0.07441 
Self employed  -0.04458  -0.02622  -0.02733  insiginficant  insignificant 
Contract – both variables used 
full time, fixed term  0.0758  0.05403  0.05331  0.05355  0.05368 
part time, open term  insignificant  0.01861  0.03671  0.01552  0.02267 
part time, fixed term  0.07986  0.05371  0.0494  0.09214  0.06817 
Self employed  -0.04452  -0.0263  -0.02742  insignificant  insignificant 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on CASE_2007 database and LFS databases for years 2003-2008 
Notes: Base category for contract variable = full time, open term contract. All coefficients in dF/dX forms i.e. they represent 
the change in probability resulting from the unit change of independent variable (in case of ―shadow‖ variable) or the change 
in probability for category X as compared to the case category.  
Second, I tried to check whether transition from non-employment to employment is related to 
increasing probability of having a shadow job.  This analysis has  also been performed by 
estimating  the  series  of  probit  models  for  each  year.  The  probability  of  transition  to 
employment between ―t‖ and ―t+1‖ has been a dependent variable and estimated probability 
of  working  in  shadow  employment  (―shadow‖)  in  period  ―t+1‖  has  been  one  of  the 
explanatory variables. Apart from that, the same set of standard control variables were used, 
all for the period ―t+1‖. Here, three versions of the model have been estimated for each year: 
one in which both the ―contract‖ and the ―shadow‖ variables have been added to the model 
specification, and two with either of the variables used.  
In this case one cannot say that the estimated coefficients of the control variables were as 
expected as it is not so obvious what the expectations should be. One has to remember that it 
is  not  the  probability  of  finding  a  new  job  by  an  unemployed  being  estimated,  but  the 
probability that a given person is a new employee provided she/he is employed at all. So in 
general it tells more about the changing (tenure/age) structure of employment or job rotation 
than about job creation. It is, however, perfectly sufficient from the point of view of our task 
as what we are interested in is the relationship between being a new employee and being in 
the shadow sphere.  
The shadow variables are significant in both models (see Table 3), although the estimated size 
of coefficients significantly differs. In either case, however, it seems that the probability of 
being in shadow employment is positively correlated with the fact of being a new employee 
(or the new self-employed).   
It also seems that the strength of this relationship decreased for the entire period analyzed 
which seems to be an interesting observation. It does not mean that as the labor market kept 
improving, new workers were hired legally more often. It only means that there was a weaker 
relationship between the very fact that they are new workers with a high probability to enter shadow employment. In fact, the estimated share of shadow workers among the new workers 
has been stable and then increasing until 2007. It fell only in 2008, almost exactly copying the 
dynamics of the general estimated share of shadow employment in total employment (see last 
raw of Table 3). In other words; although the general observed probability of employment in 
shadow  economy  for  new  workers  kept  increasing  until  2007,  this  increase  was  not 
necessarily related to the fact that they were new.  
The analysis of the ―contract‖ coefficients leads to similar conclusions. It seems obvious that 
the newly hired are more often employed fixed term and also to some extent part time. More 
precisely,  the  fact  that  an  employed  person  is  on  a  fixed  term  contract  increases  the 
probability  that  she/he  is  newly  hired.  This  tendency  (similarly  as  in  case  of  shadow 
employment) seems to weaken over the analyzed period, although the results here are not so 
clear. The part time and fixed-term employment coefficients fell until 2005, and then started 
to stabilize and increase. Once again these results tell us that any kind of employment other 
than full time and open term contracts is less and less dependent on the fact that the person is 
newly  employed.  Actually,  the  share  of  such  contracts  among  the  newly  employed  was 
increasing until 2007 and then decreased in 2008 copying the general trend (see Table 4 – last 
row).  
Table  3  -  The  relationships  (estimated  coefficients)  between  being  a  new  employee,  shadow 
employment and the type of contract 
Model/variable  2003/2004  2004/2005  2005/2006  2006/2007  2007/2008 
Shadow – only shadow variable used  0.37154  0.30424  0.29312  0.30844  0.27085 
Shadow – both variables used  0.08605  0.079  0.06387  0.04184  0.03406 
Contract – only contract variable used 
full time, fixed term  0.25178  0.21509  0.18054  0.2046  0.16998 
part time, open term  0.0625  0.03078  0.05713  0.0434  0.06489 
part time, fixed term  0.30764  0.21786  0.21479  0.25631  0.25355 
Self employed  0.02912  0.01158  insignificant  0.02537  0.02223 
Contract – both variables used 
full time, fixed term  0.22049  0.18887  0.16123  0.18912  0.15669 
part time, open term  0.05209  0.02432  0.05182  0.03824  0.05606 
part time, fixed term  0.21681  0.14191  0.15605  0.21274  0.21071 
self employed  0.0189  insignificant  insignificant  0.02086  0.01549 
The estimated share of shadow employment in total employment among the newly employed.  
% of all newly employed in shadow 
employment  8.7%  8.7%  9.1%  9%  8.5% 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on CASE_2007 and LFS datasets for Poland. 
Notes: Base category for contract variable = full time, open term contract 
 
The last step of the analysis is to examine the relationship between shadow employment and 
relative  probability  of  transitions  between  various  types  of  labor  contracts  or  out  of 
employment.  However  before  engaging  in  an  econometric  estimation,  it  is  interesting  to 
observe the actual labor market transitions for groups with various labor market positions.  
It is obvious that for any type of labor arrangement the highest is the probability that in the 
next year – ―t+1‖ (see Table 4) the labor market status will be the same as in current year – 
―t‖. The continuation of the same labor market arrangement is the most natural behavior on 
the labor market. On the other hand, the strength of this stability depends on the nature of the 
labor market arrangements as such and also on the general situation of the market.   
At first those with full time and open term contracts and the self employed are the two most 
stable groups. Over the entire period, more than 90% of those with either of these working 
arrangements in time ―t‖ did not change it within a year. The same applies to those who are not employed. It is quite an expected result, but it is also important from the point of view of 
the  shadow  employment  analysis  as  the  self-employed  are  among  those  with  higher 
probability of engagement in shadow activities.  
As one could also expect those with part time and fixed term contracts are the least stable 
group. Only 50% to 60% of persons working  on this type of contract continue the same 
working arrangement in the next year. These are also the groups with the highest transitions 
out of employment, as stated earlier. What seems important is that the observed transitions out 
of employment tend to decrease for these groups until 2007 and stabilize in 2008. At the same 
time, one observes increasing transitions to full time (fixed term contracts) but not to full time 
or part time open term contracts.  
Table 4 Observed transition probabilities between for various types of employment contracts 
between t and t+1.  
Contract  -"t"  Contract -"t+1"  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Full  time,  open 
term 
 
full time, open term  90.4%  92.9%  91.7%  93.7%  92.6% 
full time, fixed term  1.4%  1.2%  2.0%  1.5%  1.8% 
part time, open term  0.5%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.4% 
part time, fixed term  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.1%  0.1% 
self employed  0.9%  0.7%  1.0%  0.7%  1.0% 
NOT EMPLOYED  6.6%  4.8%  4.8%  3.7%  4.2% 
Full  time,  fixed 
term 
 
full time, open term  17.7%  13.4%  15.8%  15.4%  19.2% 
full time, fixed term  61.3%  70.6%  68.4%  71.9%  66.2% 
part time, open term  0.3%  0.1%  0.2%  0.3%  0.3% 
part time, fixed term  1.6%  0.9%  0.8%  1.0%  0.8% 
self employed  1.7%  2.1%  2.2%  1.6%  1.6% 
NOT EMPLOYED  17.4%  12.9%  12.6%  9.8%  11.9% 
Part  time,  open 
term 
 
full time, open term  13.6%  8.3%  13.2%  11.6%  15.8% 
full time, fixed term  1.3%  0.6%  1.5%  3.2%  3.4% 
part time, open term  70.8%  77.5%  69.0%  73.8%  68.2% 
part time, fixed term  1.6%  1.7%  1.3%  2.3%  1.8% 
self employed  1.3%  1.3%  2.1%  1.1%  1.8% 
NOT EMPLOYED  11.4%  10.6%  12.9%  8.0%  9.0% 
Part  time,  fixed 
term 
 
full time, open term  5.7%  5.3%  4.5%  5.1%  4.1% 
full time, fixed term  15.1%  11.4%  15.6%  15.6%  17.4% 
part time, open term  4.7%  4.8%  5.1%  3.0%  3.6% 
part time, fixed term  50.8%  59.9%  56.1%  57.9%  55.8% 
self employed  1.9%  1.6%  1.9%  2.1%  2.2% 
NOT EMPLOYED  21.8%  16.9%  16.7%  16.3%  16.8% 
Self employed 
 
full time, open term  1.0%  1.2%  1.0%  1.0%  0.9% 
full time, fixed term  1.2%  1.2%  1.4%  1.9%  1.6% 
part time, open term  0.0%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
part time, fixed term  0.3%  0.2%  0.1%  0.1%  0.3% 
self employed  92.7%  92.7%  91.8%  92.8%  92.5% 
NOT EMPLOYED  4.8%  4.6%  5.6%  4.1%  4.7%   
NOT-
EMPLOYED 
full time, open term  1.1%  1.0%  1.1%  0.9%  1.1% 
full time, fixed term  3.1%  3.4%  3.7%  3.9%  3.7% 
part time, open term  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1%  0.1% 
part time, fixed term  0.7%  0.7%  0.6%  0.6%  0.6% 
self employed  1.4%  1.1%  1.0%  1.2%  1.2% 
NOT EMPLOYED  93.6%  93.8%  93.4%  93.3%  93.3% 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on data from Polish LFS data for years 2003-2008. 
 
Those with full time and fixed term contracts are also the least stable groups in the labor 
market with only 60%-70% of employed continuing the same labor status in the next year. 
What seems interesting is that these are groups with relatively high probability of entering full 
time and open term contracts, suggesting that they may consider staying on  a fixed term contract as a form of queuing. It seems that the queuing role of this type of contract tended to 
increase at least since 2005 (when the observed transitions to full time open term contracts 
were 13.4%) until 2008 (when they reached 19.2%).  
It seems that the way from the least safe (and most probably shadow) part time and fixed term 
contract to the safest full time and open term contracts leads through full time and fixed term 
contracts. Although this way seems to be quite cumbersome and risky, it is still better than 
waiting in unemployment. On the other hand, self-employment seems to be a more long term 
choice (or necessity) and as such it does not seem to be a form of queuing. The observed 
incidence of entering a full time/open term contract for the self-employed is as low as for 
those unemployed.  
In order to run an econometric analysis of the relationship between the probability of shadow 
employment in year ―t‖ and the relative probabilities of various transitions on labor market 
between year ―t‖ and year ―t+1‖, I have estimated the series of multinomial logistic models in 
which the labor market status in ―t+1‖ (be it one of types of contract or lack of employment) 
was the dependent variable and the state on the labor market in ―t‖ (―contract‖ variable) and 
the estimated probability of shadow employment (―shadow‖ variable) in ―t‖ were the main 
explanatory  variables.  The  standard  set  of  control  variables  has  been  applied.  As  the 
consequence of such a specification of the model, the sample in the starting period (―t‖) had to 
be limited to the employed population only, since a series of variables including the ―shadow‖ 
variable and the ―contract‖ variable are defined only for those employed. 
The results of estimations for the ―contract‖ variable for all years are presented in Table 5. 
The estimated coefficients should be interpreted as Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) of transition 
probabilities i.e. the relative risk of transition to state X as compared to the risk of transition to 
the base category (being the full time, open term employment) is N (where N = the presented 
coefficient) times higher for the given starting state than for the baseline category (also full 
time, open term employment). So for example (see the first coefficient in the upper left corner 
of  Table  5)  the  relative  risk  of  transition  to  no-employment  as  compared  to  the  risk  of 
transition to full time/open term employment for those with full time and fixed term contracts 





Table  5  Estimated  RRR  ratios  for  transition  probabilities  among  various  labor  market 








No employment vs 
full time open term 
employment (FTOP) 
Full time fixed 
term employment 
vs (FTOP)  
Part time open 
term employment 
vs (FTOP) 






Full time fixed term 
employment 
11.1  174.5  3.4  49.3  8.6 
Part time open term 
employment 
8.3  6.1  827.0  47.9  9.2 
Part time fixed term 
employment 
19.8  99.8  131.7  3277.6  18.3 
Self Employment  43.1  56.8  3.9  111.2  7824.1 
2004-2005   No employment  Full  time  fixed 
term employment 
Part  time  open 
term employment 
Part  time  fixed 
term employment 
Self Employment 
Full time fixed term 
employment 
14.8  354.1  2.8  35.9  14.1 
Part time open term 
employment 
15.7  5.4  2822.6  78.9  17.0 
Part time fixed term 
employment 
23.7  121.7  308.7  4748.3  9.6 
Self Employment  49.3  61.0  29.0  90.4  7610.2 
2005-2006 
  No employment  Full  time  fixed 
term employment 
Part  time  open 
term employment 
Part  time  fixed 
term employment 
Self Employment 
Full time fixed term 
employment 
11.3  155.2  4.7  29.3  8.0 
Part time open term 
employment 
12.9  4.7  1689.0  48.8  12.5 
Part time fixed term 
employment 
21.8  89.0  334.1  4399.0  8.9 
Self Employment  50.4  35.3  18.9  42.4  5101.3 
2006-2007 
  No employment  Full  time  fixed 
term employment 
Part  time  open 
term employment 
Part  time  fixed 
term employment 
Self Employment 
Full time fixed term 
employment 
15.3  272.7  7.0  70.4  11.6 
Part time open term 
employment 
13.1  16.1  1694.2  148.5  11.7 
Part time fixed term 
employment 
58.3  177.0  159.0  9063.2  20.4 
Self Employment  75.7  95.7  14.3  74.3  9351.2 
2007-2008 
  No employment  Full  time  fixed 
term employment 
Part  time  open 
term employment 
Part  time  fixed 
term employment 
Self Employment 
Full time fixed term 
employment 
10.3  158.7  4.5  49.5  7.2 
Part time open term 
employment 
9.4  10.6  1000.9  99.9  10.3 
Part time fixed term 
employment 
39.6  168.6  242.2  10896.8  35.7 
Self Employment  80.5  90.9  23.9  206.3  9095.8 
Notes: Baseline resulting category  –  full time open term employment, baseline starting category  –  full time open term 
employment, All coefficients in RRR form, All coefficient statistically significant. 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on LFS data sets from years 2003-2008. 
 
The results presented in Table 5 are not surprising. At first the relative risk of transition to the 
same state as in previous year is always much (even thousands in some cases) higher than to 
full time/open term employment. Such high coefficients result from very low probability of 
transition  from  full  time/open  term  contract  to  any  form  of  contract  and  also  from  low 
probabilities of transitions from any other state to full time/open term contract.  
In addition, the relative risk of transition to non-employment increases for any type contract 
other than a full time/open term one. What is most interesting is that this relative risk is the 
highest for the self-employed. Partially it is a result of very low probability of transition from 
self-employment to full time/open term employment, but on the other hand it also means that 
if one treats the open term/full time employment as the ―ideal‖ state, engagement in self-
employment is in relative terms the ―worse‖ possible option with the highest risk to end up 
without  any  employment  next  year  instead  of  reaching  the  goal.  So  it  proves  the  earlier 
observations drawn from the analysis of actual labor market transitions (Table 4).  It is important to underline that the estimated relative probabilities are very volatile depending 
on the year of estimation and that the obtained coefficients do not seem to follow any easily 
identifiable trend. This suggests that we should treat the results obtained as more qualitative 
than quantitative and that we should not treat them as estimates of actual relations.  
The results for the ―shadow‖ variable (Table 6) are also presented in Relative Risk Ratio 
terms  and  they  can  be  interpreted  as  the  change  of  relative  risk  of  given  transition  as 
compared to transition to full time/open term employment resulting from the unit change of 
probability of shadow employment.  
The estimated relative risk ratios seriously change from year to year and it may be related to 
high correlation of the ―shadow‖ variable with the ―contract‖ variable. In this model, they had 
to be used together in order to obtain interpretable results for the ―shadow‖ variable as the 
model  specifications  where  only  this  variable  was  used  resulted  in  coefficients  close  to 
infinity or zero depending on  the base categories. Therefore, as in case of the ―contract‖ 
variable, one should treat these results more as qualitative indications of general tendencies 
than as estimates of actual relations. 
In any case, it seems that one may try to draw some systematic observations:  
(1) From the point of view of its dependence from shadow employment, transition to part 
time/open term employment is not qualitatively different than transition to full time/open 
term employment, 
(2) Shadow employment seems to mostly influence the relative probability of transition to 
self-employment (as compared to full time/open term employment) although even this 
coefficient is not statistically significant for all years, 
(3) Shadow  employment  also  seems  to  positively  influence  the  relative  probability  of 
transition out of employment. 
 
These results seem to suggest that shadow employment is either the way to self-employment 
(be it registered or not) or to unemployment. It does not seem to be the path to full time/open 
term contracts or to any other type of open term contracts. It is important to underline that 
these  results  are  obtained  with  a  model  specification  where  one  controls  for  the  type  of 
contract, i.e., they may be interpreted as ―pure‖ effects of shadow employment probability on 
the relative transition probabilities.  
 
Table 6 - RRR for transitions to given type of contract compared to full time/open term contract 
resulting from unit change in shadow employment probability 
Year  No  employment 
versus  full  time 
open term (FTOP) 
Full time fixed term 
employment  versus 
(FTOP) 
Part time open term 
employment  versus 
(FTOP) 
Part  time  fixed 
term  employment 
versus (FTOP) 
Self  Employment 
versus (FTOP) 
2004  22.7  6.1  insignificant  5.6  20.9 
2005  16.7  3.4  insignificant  insignificant  263.4 
2006  32.5  7.6  insignificant  10.1  287.7 
2007  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant  51.3 
2008  5.3  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant  insignificant 
Source: Author‘s calculations based on LFS data sets from years 2003-2008. 
 5.  Conclusions 
The estimated share of shadow workers in total employment in Poland in years 2003-2008 
was increasing until 2006 and then started to decrease in the years 2007 and 2008. The trend 
changed,  although  throughout  the  entire  period  of  analysis  the  Polish  labor  market  was 
booming. It seems that in the first period (until 2006), the labor market situation was still 
difficult and workers were still very likely to accept the fixed term jobs offered by companies. 
At  the  same  time  companies  did  not  have  to  compete  for  workers  with  better  working 
conditions. After 2006, when the labor market situation started to improve very dynamically, 
the companies started to offer them better (more stable) jobs, and workers were more reluctant 
to accept fixed term jobs. It is logical to assume that similar patterns of behavior were also 
observed in shadow employment, which (by most of the related literature) is assessed as 
counter-cyclical. 
The same pattern has been observed for all main groups of employers, although not for all 
groups  of  employees.  Decreasing  probability  of  entering  shadow  employment  for  the 
youngest cohort (24 and below) might be related to demography and increasing participation 
in  tertiary  education.  On  the  other  hand,  increasing  participation  in  shadow  employment 
among  the oldest workers (65  and  above)  can  have its  sources in  more rigid  regulations 
concerning disability pensions.   
Throughout the entire period, working in the shadow economy (or working under any other 
type of contract than full time/open term) increased the probability of losing a job, however as 
the labor market situation improved the relative (and as a consequence also the absolute) 
position of those in  shadow employment improved as  well. As  soon  as  the labor market 
started  to  deteriorate,  the  relative  situation  of  those  in  shadow  employment  started  to 
deteriorate again.  
Those entering employment tend to be engaged in shadow employment (or other non-standard 
working contracts) than those with higher employment tenures. It seems however that as soon 
as the labor market improves, the relative importance of being a new employee decreases. It 
means that more prevalent shadow employment in the Polish labor market in years 2003-2006 
did not necessarily apply only to new workers, but to all employed.   
We also found some evidence that engaging in non-standard dependent employment can be 
treated as a form of queuing for more stable employment contracts. It seems that the way from 
the least safe (and most probably shadow) part time and fixed term contract to the safest full 
time and open term contracts leads through full time and fixed term contracts. Although this 
way seems to be quite cumbersome and risky, it is still better than waiting in unemployment.   
On the other hand, self-employment seems to be a more long term choice (or necessity) and as 
such it does not seem to be the form of queuing. The observed incidence of entering a full 
time/open  term  contract  for  the  self-employed  is  as  low  as  for  those  unemployed. 
Additionally, although the relative risk (as compared to the risk of transition to full time/open 
term employment) of transition to non-employment is higher for any non standard working 
contract, this relative risk is the highest for the self-employed. It means that if one treats open 
term/full time employment as the ―ideal‖ state, engagement in self employment is in relative 
terms  the  ―worse‖  possible  option  with  the  highest  chances  to  end  up  without  any 
employment next year instead of reaching the goal.  
Our results also suggest that shadow employment is either the way to self-employment (be it 
registered or not) or to unemployment, it does not however seem to be the path to full time open term contracts or to any other type of open term contracts. It is important to underline 
that these results are obtained with model specification where one controlled for the type of 
contract i.e. one may interpret them as the ―pure‖ effect of shadow employment probability on 
the relative transition probabilities.  
The results obtained are in line with one of the main conclusions of the CASE study from 
2007  suggesting  that  shadow  employment  is  more  a  way  of  coping  with  lack  of  other 
employment  opportunities  than  an  equivalent  or  even  superior  alternative  to  any  legal 
employment contracts. However, it is worth noting that those who enter shadow employment 
are also the more active part of the group having problems with finding full time/open term 
employment. They are much more inclined to cope with their situation by entering some form 
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